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Home Decor Center, Inc. v. Google, Inc., et al., Case No. CV-12-5706-GW(SHx) 
Tentative Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment 
***This tentative ruling has been distributed only to the parties. Some of the documentation 
submitted in connection with these motions was filed under seal. Should either party wish this 
tentative ruling redacted so as to maintain the confidentiality of sealed material, such request 
must be made to the Court at the hearing. Otherwise, this Order will be publicly docketed.*** 
I. Background 
Plaintiff Home Decor Center ("Plaintiff'') filed suit in state court against Google, Inc. 
("Google" or "Defendant") and Home Depot, Inc. ("Home Depot") on May 29, 2012. See 
generally Compl., Docket No.1, Ex. A. Google and Home Depot timely removed. Docket No. 
1 at 2. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on July 25, 2012, asserting nine 
causes of action under federal and state law related to the alleged infringement of Plaintiffs 
trademarks.-L See generally Docket No. 16. On September 20, 2012, the Court grantedin part 
Google's motion to dismiss the FAC. See generally Docket No. 29. Plaintiff filed the Second 
Amended Complaint ("SAC") on October 1, 2012. Docket No. 31. On January 29, 2013, 
Plaintiff and Home Depot stipulated to a dismissal of Home Depot, leaving Google as the sole 
remaining Defendant in this case. See Docket No. 38.2 
The SAC asserts five causes of action against Google: (1) trademark infringement and 
unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (2) vicarious trademark 
infringement; (3) contributory trademark infringement; ( 4) unfair business practices under Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code§ 17200 ("Section 17200" or "UCL"); and (5) interference with "prospective 
contractual relations."3 See generally SAC. Plaintiffs claims are all premised on Home Depot's 
alleged use ofGoogle's AdWords program to create advertisements for a website Home Depot 
operates called "www.homedecorators.com." SAC~~ 13-22, 39-41, 57-58, 64-66, 74, 83-4. 
Plaintiff is the owner of a purported mark known as "Home Decor Center" (No. 
1The FAC asserted claims for: (1) federal trademark infringement and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a); (2) unfair competition under the Lanham Act; (3) unfair business practices under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§§ 17200, et seq.; (4) trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; (5) contributory trademark infringement under 
the Lanham Act; (6) vicarious trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; (7) injunctive relief; (8) interference 
with prospective contractual relations; and (9) "passing off' under the Lanham Act. See generally F AC. 
20n February 4, 2013, the Court entered an order dismissing all claims against Home Depot with prejudice. 
See Docket No. 39. 
3Though Plaintiff characterizes its fifth cause of action as one for interference with "prospective contractual 
relations," the SAC appears to plead a claim for what is more commonly referred to as interference with "prospective 
economic advantage." See SAC~~ 80-87. There are distinctions between a claim for interference with "prospective 
economic advantage" (as Plaintiff seems to have pled here), and a claim for interference with "existing contractual 
relations." See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1157 (2003) ("We caution that 
although we find the intent requirement to be the same for the torts of intentional interference with contract and 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, these torts remain distinct." ). Here, Plaintiff does not 
allege that Google interfered with its existing contractual relations. See SAC~ 82 ("Plaintiff has prospective 
contractual relationships with its consumers that use Google as a search engine.") (emphasis added). 
-1-
Case 2:12-cv-05706-GW-SH   Document 108   Filed 05/09/13   Page 2 of 13   Page ID #:3249
85524323), which is registered in the Supplemental Register of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office ("USPTO"). Pl.'s Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Docket No. 73, Ex. 
A.4 Plaintiff originally sought to have "Home Decor Center" placed on the USPTO's Principal 
Register, but the USPTO rejected Plaintiffs application in May 2012, indicating that "Home 
Decor Center" was "merely descriptive" and that the word "Center" was generic in the context of 
Plaintiffs claimed mark. Vick Decl., Docket No. 49, Ex. 2 at 3-6. Plaintiffs amended applica-
tion to place its mark on the Supplemental Register was later granted. Pl. RJN, Ex. A. Plaintiff 
also alleges that it owns the registered domain name "homedecorcenter.com," and that advertise-
ments created or authorized by Google through its AdWords program have caused damage to 
Plaintiff by confusing its customers and misdirecting them to Home Depot's "www.home 
decorators. com" website. SAC~~ 17, 20-21, 23-27, 40. Plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive 
relief, and restitution as a result of Google's allegedly wrongful conduct. Id at Prayer. 
Google AdWords operates with the Google search engine to permit third-party advertisers 
"to post their digital fliers where they might be most readily received in the cyber-marketplace." 
-Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Beyond the "organic" search 
results that are linked to potentially relevant websites in response to a user's search queries, 
AdWords provides third-party paid advertisements. See Vick Decl., Ex. 6 at 38-40.5 These 
advertisements are distinct from organic search results and appear in a separate shaded box on 
certain parts ofGoogle results webpages and include visual labels such as "Ads." Vick Decl., 
Ex. 7A at 93, 113-114; Ex. 10. 
Ad Words allows advertisers to initially select and bid on "keywords" (including phrases) 
that trigger ads if they match a Google user's search query. See Vick Decl., Ex. 6 at 38-40; Ex. 7 
at 93, Ex. 113-14; Ex. 10, Ex. 11. The advertisers can also use a feature known as "dynamic 
keywords insertion," in which they can have a specific keyword inserted into the text of an ad 
itself. Id; see also Ex. 12. The Terms and Conditions ofthe AdWords program provide that 
advertisers are "solely responsible for all (i) creative (ii) Ad trafficking or targeting decisions 
(e.g. keywords)[.]" Id, Ex. 14 ~ 1. 
The advertisements at issue in this case stem from the keywords "home decor center," 
"homedecorcenter.com" and "homedecorcenter," each of which, according to Google, were 
chosen by Home Depot. See Def. Mot., Docket No. 88, at 5-6; Vick Decl., Ex. 9 at 11, 17, 40, 
48, 101, 134; Ex. 6 at 19, 41, 155, 184. Plaintiff, conversely, alleges that Google worked 
'jointly" with Home Depot "to create the content" of the ads, evidenced in part by Google's 
policy of"review[ing] each ad." SAC~~ 25-27. As a result of dynamic keyword insertion, 
Google admits that some of the advertisements contained the terms "home decor center," 
homedecorcenter" or "homedecorcenter.com" in the ad text itself. Def. Mot. at 5-6. Even 
though these terms appeared in the ad text, Google maintains that the green Display URL 
appearing underneath the ads was always "www.homedecorators.com" (as opposed to Plaintiffs 
4The Court would GRANT Plaintiff's request to take judicial notice of this registration pursuant to Fed. R. 
Evid. 201. See Docket No. 73. 
5 As some of the documents in this case have been filed under seal, the Court's citations to the parties' 
moving papers and exhibits generally refer to page numbers of the non-electronic courtesy copies filed with the 
Court. 
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"homedecorcenter.com" URL). See Vick Decl., Ex. 9 at 152-53. Plaintiff, however, claims that 
when users typed "Home Decor Center" or "homedecorcenter.com" into the Google search 
engine or the address bar of web browers on mobile devices or personal computers, the resulting 
ads bearing Plaintiff's purported mark would redirect users to Home Depot's website. SAC~~ 
17, 32-54. 
On April11, 2013, Google moved for summary judgment on the grounds that "Home 
Decor Center" is not a valid trademark and that Plaintiff's state law claims premised on its 
purported mark must likewise fail. Google also argues that the state law claims are indepen-
dently defective and barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(1) ("Section 230 "),which prohibits providers of interactive computer services from being 
treated as the "publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content 
provider." See generally Def. Mot. at 20-24. 
II. Legal Standard 
· Summary judgment shall be granted when a movant "shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56( a). In other words, summary judgment should be entered against a party "who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, 
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Parth v. Pomona Valley Hosp. 
Med Ctr., 630 F.3d 794, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2010). 
To satisfy its burden at summary judgment, a moving party without the burden of 
persuasion - such as Defendant here - "must either produce evidence negating an essential 
element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not 
have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." 
Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). See 
also Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane) ("When the nonmoving 
party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out 'that there is an 
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.' ") (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), and citing Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Celotex "showing" can be made by "pointing out through 
· argument ... the absence of evidence to support plaintiff's claim")). Further, 
[i]fthe party moving for summary judgment meets its initial 
burden of identifying for the court the portions of the materials 
on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine 
issue of material fact, the nonmoving party may not rely on the 
mere allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude sum-
mary judgment[, but instead] must set forth, by affidavit or as 
otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. 
T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass 'n, 809 F .2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). At the summary judgment stage, the court does 
not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and views all evidence and 
draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id at 630-31 (citing 
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)); Hrdlicka v. 
Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011); Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1075 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(en bane); Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 860 n.l (9th Cir. 2005). 
III. Analysis 
A. The Validity of Plaintiffs "Home Decor Center" Trademark 
Plaintiff argues that it "does in fact have a valid registered trademark that was used since 
November of2007 as reflected by the USPTO Certificate of Trademark the Plaintiff obtained." 
Pl. Opp., Docket No. 85, at 17. Plaintiff further asserts that because it has used "Home Decor 
Center" and "HomeDecorCenter.com" since early 2006 and has "exhausted a substantial amount 
of resources over the past seven years" promoting the mark, "Home Decor Center" has acquired 
secondary meaning and is thus valid. Id Plaintiff also cites the expert declaration of Howard 
Marylander to argue that the mark is "not a generic" term. Id (citing Marylander Decl., Docket 
No. 72, Ex. A at 6).6 
To succeed on its trademark infringement claim, Plaintiff must show that it has a 
protectable mark and that the alleged infringer's imitating mark is similar enough to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. Sur.fvtvor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 
F. 3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2005). "[U]nder Section 32 or 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff has 
the burden to establish that" it has "a valid, protectable trademark." Multi Time Mach., Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, No. 11-9076, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23333, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013). 
"[U]nlike principal registration, supplemental registration is not 'prima facie evidence of the 
validity of the registered mark ... of the registrant's ownership of the mark, [or] of the 
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce."' CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA 
Health Sciences, Inc., 474 F.3d 626, 629 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). "[T]he fact that a 
term is registered on the Supplemental Register does not entitle it to any statutory presumption 
that the term is a trademark and not a generic name." 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition ("McCarthy")§ 19:36 (2012); Novartis Consumer Health v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., No. 
99-280, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20981, at *11-13 (D.N.J. Sep. 13, 1999) (same). Some courts 
have found that the USPTO's rejection of a trademark application for the Principal Register can 
serve as "persuasive authority indicating that the mark is not protectable[.]" See Closed Loop 
Mktg., Inc. v. Closed Loop Mktg., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217-18 (E.D. Cal. 2008) ("In rejecting 
plaintiffs application, the PTO answered the same question facing this court, whether the name 
is protectable. "); see also Schwan's IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Company, 3 79 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 
1021 (D. Minn. 2005). 
There are "four different categories of terms with respect to trademark protection: (1) 
generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and ( 4) arbitrary or fanciful." Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. 
v. Asian Journal Publications, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Surgicenters of 
America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir.l979)). Only the 
first two of these categories are implicated here. Google argues that "Home Decor Center" is a 
generic term, while Plaintiff argues that the term is protectable because it is descriptive and has 
6 Howard Marylander is president of a company that specializes in "the conduct and evaluation of survey 
research for litigation." See Marylander Decl. ~ 1. 
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secondary meaning. Compare, e.g., Def. Mot. at 7-10 with Pl. Opp. at 17. 
"A 'generic' term is one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the 
genus of which the particular product or service is a species. It cannot become a trademark under 
any circumstances." Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. "To determine whether a term 
has become generic, we look to whether consumers understand the word to refer only to a 
particular producer's goods or whether the consumer understands the word to refer to the goods 
themselves." Yellow Cab Co. v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 
2005) (citation omitted). One method of determining whether a product is generic is to evaluate 
whether "buyers understand the term as being identified with 'a particular producer's goods or 
services or 'with all such goods and services, regardless of their suppliers."' Surgicenters, 601 
F.2d at 1016. In the latter instance, the term is generic. Similarly, courts in the Ninth Circuit use 
the "who-are-you" or "what-are-you" test: A valid mark answers the buyer's questions, "Who 
are you? Where do you come from? Who vouches for you?" See Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d 
at 1147 (quoting Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993). The 
· generic name of the product, on the other hand, answers the question "What are you?" Filipino 
Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. "Whether a mark is generic is a question of fact." Stuhlbarg 
Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001)." 
"A descriptive term, unlike a generic term, can be a subject for trademark protection 
under appropriate circumstances." Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. "Although descrip-
tive terms generally do not enjoy trademark protection, a descriptive term can be protected 
provided that it has acquired 'secondary meaning' in the minds of consumers, i.e., it has "become 
distinctive ofthe [trademark] applicant's goods in commerce." !d. (citing Abercrombie & Fitch 
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.) and 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)). 
Courts occasionally refer to descriptive terms as "merely descriptive" terms (as opposed to 
generic or "common descriptive" terms. Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147 (citation 
omitted). 
For a descriptive term to obtain secondary meaning, a plaintiff must show that there is a 
"mental association by a substantial segment of consumers and potential consumers between the 
alleged mark and a single source of the product." Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, 778 F.2d 
1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane). "Secondary meaning can be established in many ways, 
including (but not limited to) direct consumer testimony; survey evidence; exclusivity, manner, 
and length of use of a mark; amount and manner of advertising; amount of sales and number of 
customers; established place in the market; and proof of intentional copying by the defendant." 
Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1151. "[T]he question of secondary meaning is one of fact." 
Levi Strauss & Co., 778 F.2d at 1355. 
Here, the Court would conclude that Plaintiff's purported "Home Decor Center" mark is 
generic. "[T]he primary significance of [Plaintiff's claimed] trademark is to describe the type of 
product rather than the producer," and thus merely answers the question, "what are you?" 
Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147 (emphasis in original). Combining the words "home 
decor" with "center" does not primarily denote a specific origin or source. Rather, it merely 
identifies the "type of product" sold by Plaintiff, answering the consumer's "what are you" 
question with the response, a "center" that provides "home decor." See id. The evidence before 
the Court confirms this conclusion. A "TEFLON" genericness survey found that 79.6% of the 
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relevant consumer group viewed the phrase "Home Decor Center" as a generic description of a 
product category or type of store; by contrast, only 5.4% of that group perceived "Home Decor 
Center" as a brand name, and 14.9% did not know what it was. See Vick Decl., Ex. 17 at 7-8, 
16, 24-27, 95-111, 137-153.7 Under the "primary significance" test in 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), 
"[m]ajority use controls" whether a term is generic or not. 2 McCarthy§ 12:6. "For example, if 
a survey showed 75% of the public regard the word as generic, then that is its majority usage and 
its 'principal significance."' Id.; see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 756 F. 
Supp. 1292, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("If a properly conducted [TEFLON] survey shows that 72% 
of the relevant public regards [the claimed mark] as generic, then that is its principal significance, 
and a court is justified in according substantial weight to such a survey."). Defendant has sub-
mitted additional evidence indicating that businesses selling home decor goods use the term 
"home decor center" to generically describe stores or sections of stores that sell home decor 
products, and consumers use the phrase "home decor center" when seeking home decor goods. 
See Vick Decl., Exs. 23-27. A variety of definitions of"home decor" and "center" further 
·suggest thatthe purported mark is generic (id, Ex. 28), and one of Plaintiffs USPTO applica-
tions actually disclaimed any right to exclusively use "center" apart from the mark. See id, Ex. 3 
at 4; see also Ex. 2 at 4, 6 (USPTO's written rejection of Plaintiffs initial application). Plaintiff 
is apparently not even the only business named "Home Decor Center" in the United States. See 
id, Ex. 26.8 
In response to Defendant's arguments, Plaintiff has not provided any meaningful evi-
dence or legal authority indicating that its mark is not generic. Rather, Plaintiff argues that 
because its claimed mark appears on the USPTO's Supplemental Register, Plaintiff has a valid 
trademark, and that "actual confusion should be determined by the trier of fact." See, e.g., Pl. 
Opp. at 14, 17-19. But, as explained above, merely registering a term on the Supplemental 
Register does not create prima facie evidence of the validity of the purported mark, see CreAgri, 
474 F.3d at 629 n.6, and the likelihood of confusion analysis becomes relevant here only if 
Plaintiffs mark is in fact valid. The Opposition thus puts the cart before the horse. While 
Plaintiff suggests that genericness is disputed because the mark has acquired secondary meaning 
(Pl. Opp. at 18), "[t]he question of genericness and secondary meaning are indeed two distinct 
issues; if the object is generic, the question of secondary meaning is irrelevant." Glassybaby, 
LLC v. Provide Gifts, Inc., No. 11-380, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113215, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. 
7 Defendant's surveys were conducted by Dr. Jerry Yoram Wind, a Professor ofMarketing at th~ Wharton 
School at the University of Pennsylvania. See Vick Decl., Ex. 17, at 1. Dr. Wind received his B.S. and M.A. from 
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and received a PhD in marketing from Stanford University. I d. Dr. Wind has 
been a member of the Wharton faculty since 1967 and has authored 22 books and more than 250 research papers. 
I d. He has testified or been deposed in a number of cases over the last four years. See id. at Appendix G to the 
report. 
8Courts routinely consider extrinsic evidence such as usage by sellers and consumers in the relevant trade, 
advertisements on the Internet, dictionary definitions and newspaper articles when ruling on genericness in the 
context of summary judgment motions. See, e.g., Surgicenters, 60 I F.2d at I 0 I7-I8; Premier Nutrition, Inc. v. 
Organic Food Bar, Inc., No. 06-827,2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78353, at *15-21,29 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008) aff'd, 
327 F. App'x 723 (9th Cir. 2009) (relying in part on definitions, term usage, and marketing materials to conclude 
that claimed "organic food bar" mark was generic). 
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Sept. 30, 2011) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)); see also 
Indonesian Imports, Inc. v. Old Navy, Inc., No. 97-3534, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4237, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1999) ("If[plaintiff's] claimed dress is generic-no amount of secondary 
meaning evidence can save it"). 
In granting summary judgment to defendants in similar cases of alleged trademark 
infringement, courts have found that marks consisting of a type of product or service plus 
"center" or "house" or "store" are generic. In Surgicenters, for instance, the Ninth Circuit held 
that Plaintiff's "Surgicenter" mark "obviously means surgical center" and was thus generic. 
Surgicenters, 601 F.2d at 1017-18. Similarly, in Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, 
205 F.3d 137, 141 (4th Cir. 2000), the court held that the plaintiff"has no protectable interest in 
the words 'ale house"' because "[t]hey are generic words for a facility that serves beer and ale.") 
See also Convenient Food Mart, Inc. v. 6-Twelve Convenient Mart, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1457, 
1464 (D. Md. 1998) aff'd 870 F.2d 654 (granting summary judgment for defendant because 
"Convenient Food Mart" mark was generic). Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Court would 
-conclude that Plaintiff's claimed mark is generic and not entitled to trademark protection. 
However, even if the evidence set forth by Google were insufficient to sustain a finding 
of genericness by itself, "Home Decor Center," if held to be descriptive, lacks the requisite 
secondary meaning to warrant trademark protections. "Home Decor Center," if descriptive, 
"would be the feeblest of descriptive marks - in the words of one court, 'perilously close to the 
generic line."' Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1151 (citation omitted). "Such a weak des-
criptive mark could be a valid trademark only with a strong showing of secondary meaning." Id 
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence of secondary meaning, courts consider 
factors "including (1) whether the actual purchasers of the product bearing the claimed trademark 
associate the trademark with the producer, (2) the degree and manner of advertising under the 
claimed trademark, (3) the length and manner of use of the claimed trademark, and (4) whether 
the use of the claimed trademark has been exlcusive." Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom 
Am. Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Here, the evidence indicates that few customers associate the claimed mark with Plaintiff. 
In addition to the data discussed above, Defendant submitted another survey indicating that only 
10.1% of the relevant public associates "Home Decor Center" with a single company. Vick 
Decl., Ex. 17 at 7-9, 23-27, 112-53. Even among the respondent~ who heard or saw the term or 
phrase "Home Decor Center," none described it as a brand, store, or website. Id, Ex. 17 at 18-
22, 86-91.9 While Plaintiff argues that it has "exhausted a substantial amount of resources over 
the past seven years in advertising and promoting" the claimed mark (Pl. Opp. at 18), the only 
expert survey in the record indicates that Plaintiff's efforts have apparently been unable to create 
an association between Plaintiff and its purported mark. 10 See Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA 
9 Plaintiff claims that the expert report prepared by Defendant was a "late submission," but the report was 
provided to Plaintiff consistent with the timeline set forth in Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(i), and Defendant's summary judgment 
motion was filed in accordance with the Scheduling Order. See Docket No. 97 at 2-3. Plaintiff submitted a rebuttal 
expert report from Howard Marylander. See Docket No. 72. 
10Piaintiff's advertising efforts have been relatively modest, given that its business was founded in 2007, 
little advertising has taken place outside Southern California, and ad spending has been insubstantial. See Vick 
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Entm 't Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The true test of secondary meaning is the 
effectiveness of the advertising effort"). Morever, there are no survey results from which a trier 
of fact could reasonably conclude that "Home Decor Center" is not generic or has obtained 
secondary meaning, and the Court should not find Plaintiff's criticisms of Professor Wind's 
surveys relevant or sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record. See Def. Reply, Docket 
No. 93, at 6-12. 
In addition to the demonstrable absence of a strong association between Plaintiff and its 
purported mark, the length and manner of Plaintiff's use of "Home Decor Center" - as well as 
the mark's lack of exclusivity- also weigh against finding secondary meaning. Plaintiff's 
business was founded in one of its co-owner's garages in 2007, and Home Decor Center has 
never had more than one physical store. Vick Decl., Ex. 8 at 7, 22, 205. There are also at least 
two other businesses named "Home Decor Center" in the United States (see Vick Decl., Exs. 26-
27), further undermining Plaintiff's position. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970) (lack of exclusivity weighed against secondary meaning); Echo 
Travel,Jnc.-v. Travel Associates, Inc., 870 F.2d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). 
Thus, the foregoing factors demonstrate that Plaintiff's use and advertising of its claimed 
marks are insufficient to establish secondary meaning. "Where the party asserting trademark 
rights ... fails to set forth sufficient evidence from which a trier-of-fact could reasonably 
conclude the establishment of secondary meaning in the relevant market as of the relevant time, 
summary judgment for the adverse party is appropriate." Chrysler Corp v. Vanzant, 44 F. Supp. 
2d 1062, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999). The Court would therefore conclude that Plaintiff's claimed 
mark is generic and, even if descriptive, lacks secondary meaning. Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claims for trademark infringement, contributory 
trademark infringement, and vicarious trademark infringement would thus be GRANTED. 11 
B. Plaintiff's Remaining State Law Claims 
Plaintiff's remaining state law claims for (1) unfair business practices under Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 17200 and (2) intentional interference with prospective contractual relations are 
both related to the underlying acts of alleged trademark infringement discussed above. There-
fore, to the extent these claims rest on the validity of Plaintiff's purported mark, the Court would 
GRANT Defendant's motion for summary judgment on those claims: in the absence of trade-
mark infringement, Google's conduct was not "unlawful" within the meaning of the UCL, and 
Google did not wrongfully use a protected trademark to interfere with Plaintiff's prospective 
contractual relations. 
Decl., Ex. 19 at 6, Ex. 8 at 30, 76, 128, 149, 189-196. The only evidence Plaintiffhas submitted to support its claim 
of substantial advertising efforts consists of a printout from Plaintiffs website, several press releases, promotional 
awards, and several Yelp reviews. See Jafari Decl., Docket No. 83, Ex. D at 20-49. 
11 Even if the mark were valid, the Court would find that there is insufficient evidence in the record to 
support Plaintiffs Lanham Act claims. See Def. Mot. at 16-20. It is also unclear whether there is still a basis for the 
injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff, given that Plaintiff and Home Depot entered into a stipulation dismissing Home 
Depot from the action and Home Depot has apparently ceased using the challenged terms. See Docket Nos. 38, 39; 
Vick Decl., Ex. 9 at 36-38, 83-84. 
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To the extent Plaintiffs state law claims are not wholly derivative of its Lanham Act 
claims, the Court would conclude that they fail for additional reasons. For example, Plaintiff 
argues that its customers were misled into believing that they received substandard service from 
the Home Decor Center as a result of being redirected to Google-created ads when searching for 
Plaintiffs website. Pl. Opp. at 6. Plaintiff claims that Home Depot "admitted in discovery that 
when Google search users typed in the Plaintiffs 'Home Decor Center' trademark and/or domain 
name, these users had in fact clicked on the infringing advertisements and made purchases 
thereafter." !d. Plaintiffs expert estimates that damages relating to this matter "are currently at a 
minimum of$730,893.00[.]" !d. But as this Court noted in ruling on Defendant's motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, "the caselaw clearly indicates that neither Google's 
alleged individual authorization of each ad through the AdWords program, nor allegations that 
Google profited from the Home Depot's ad, permit Plaintiffs claims against Google to escape 
[Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act's] broad grant of immunity.") See Docket No. 
29 at 5. As explained more fully below, the evidence in this case indicates that Home Depot was 
the party responsible for selecting the "dynamic" keywords containing the terms "home decor 
center," "homedecorcenter" or "homedecorcenter.com" (none of which are trademarked) in the 
ad text itself. See Vick Decl., Ex. 9 at 11, 17, 40, 48, 101, 134; Ex. 6 at 19, 41, 155, 184. While 
this conduct is arguably actionable on various state law grounds as against Home Depot, Plaintiff 
chose to voluntarily dismiss Home Depot from this case. See Docket No. 38. By contrast, courts 
have repeatedly dismissed claims against Google which attempt to impose liability for claims 
arising out of third parties' use of the AdWords Program. See, e.g., Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 
1122-1123 ("[Google's] AdWords program simply allows competitors to post their digital fliers . 
. . [Google] is therefore immunized from liability [under Section 230]."); Goodard v. Google, 
Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198-1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that Google merited Section 
230 immunity because "Google's AdWords program was [not] anything other than 'a framework 
that could be utitlized for proper or improper purposes"') (internal citations omitted). 
While this Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to amend in case it could establish that 
Google was involved in creating or developing the advertisements at issue (Docket No. 29 at 5), 
the evidence indicates that Plaintiff has failed to do so. Plaintiff has submitted a presentation that 
Google presented to Home Depot employees, communications between Google account repre-
sentatives and Home Depot employees, and a user interface of Home Depot's AdWords account. 
See generally Jafari Decl., Docket No. 83, Exs. G, M, N, R, S. Much of this material is not 
facially related to the creation of the Home Depot advertisements at issue or is otherwise benign. 
The e-mails between Google and Home Depot do not suggest that Google "participat[ ed]" in the 
creation of the advertisements at issue. 12 See id., Ex. Mat 162-169. For example, while one 
Google employee wrote that she "stuck with the general promo text" for the (unspecified) 
advertisements, that statement does not suggest that the Google employee "created" the "promo 
text" - especially given that the exact same exhibit shows that Larry Hall, the Home Depot 
12Nor does Google's presentation to Home Depot suggest that Google created the ads at issue. Rather, it 
provides general information about online marketing and search in relation to the home decor industry. Ironically, 
Google's use of the phrase "home decor" in this presentation is yet another example of the genericness of Plaintiffs 
claimed mark. See Ex. G at 82. 
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employee responsible for the AdWords account, sent an e-mail to the Google employee two 
hours earlier apparently including the "general" promotional text she references. Id at 162. 
Plaintiff also cites an e-mail from a Google employee stating that "Larry [Hall] has still be pretty 
MIA ... not responsive to the efforts, product plan, etc." Pl. Opp. at 8. Once again, this e-mail 
does not suggest that Google created the advertisements at issue. In fact, Larry Hall, the Home 
Depot employee, testified that "[i]t would have been me who implemented the [ad] campaign," 
including the keyword "homedecorcenter.com." Vick Decl., Ex. 9 at 101:3-10; 134:2-7. The 
evidence supplied by Plaintiff indicates that, at the most, Google merely authorized each ad 
through its Ad Words program. 13 As explained by this Court in its previous ruling, such conduct 
is not actionable. See Docket No. 29 at 5; see also CYBERsitter, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 12-
5293,2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168356, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2012) (Google entitled to 
Section 230 immunity "for [the] infringing content of the advertisements at issue" because the 
state law allegations did "not amount to the heightened level of 'material contribution' that the 
Ninth Circuit requires [under Section 230] ... to find that [Google] is an information content 
provider"). 14 Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs state law claims are not grounded exclusively in 
the validity of the "Home Decor Center" mark itself, the Court would conclude that Plaintiffhas 
failed to provide any basis for stripping Google of the Section 230 immunity that applies to the 
remainder of its state law claims. 
Moreover, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that it is entitled to any form of relief available 
under Section 17200, or that Google knowingly interfered with specific, existing economic 
relationships as required for Plai~tiffs intentional interference claim. The UCL encompasses a 
broad range of activity, but it "provides only limited remedies: restitution and injunctive relief." 
Shersher v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 4th 1491, 1497 (2007). "It has become a common 
practice for plaintiffs asserting a UCL claim (whether or not in a consumer case) to seek 
'restitution' in order to invoke the court's broad equitable powers, even though the term 
'restitution' does not accurately describe the relief sought." Shersher, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 1497. 
"Restitution" under the UCL is limited to "money or property that defendants took directly from 
plaintiff' or "money or property in which [plaintiff] has a vested interest." Korea Supply Co. v. 
13 Exhibit N, which includes printouts from the AdWords "Ops Control Center," a user interface, was 
admittedly accessible to Home Depot and, as explained above, Larry Hall testified that he created and uploaded the 
content therein. See Vick Decl., Ex. 9 at 101:3-10; 134:2-7; Second Vick Reply Decl., Docket No. 94, Ex. 38 at 72:-
3-74:22,77:6-20,79:15-81:3, 85:23-92:8. Plaintiff's Exhibit R is similarly non-incriminating; it simply displays a 
Google employee attempting to resolve an issue with an advertisement that had been flagged as possibly trademarked 
despite the lack of any trademarked terms, and there is nothing to suggest that it relates to the terms at issue here. 
Jafari Decl., Ex. R. Finally, it is unclear to the Court how any expedited reviews of the ads Home Depot submitted 
to Google (ExhibitS) has any bearing on the alleged wrongfulness of Defendant's conduct in this case. 
14 As noted by the CYBERSitter court, "to the extent Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendant's toritous 
conduct related to something other than the content of the advertisements, [Section 230] immunity does not apply." 
CYBERSitter, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168356, at *14-15 (citing Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1122); see also Universal 
Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413,419 (1st Cit. 2007) ("A key limitation [ofthe Communications 
Decency Act] is that immunity only applies when the information that forms the basis for the state law claim has 
been provided by another information content provider.") (emphasis in original). Here, Plaintiff's claims appear to 
be premised entirely on "the content of the advertisements" and thus Section 230 immunity should apply. 
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Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1149 (2003). A restitution order "requires both that 
money or property have been lost by a plaintiff, on the one hand, and that it have been acquired 
by a defendant, on the other." Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310,336 (2011). 
While in its Statement of Genuine Issues ("SGI") (Docket No. 86, ~ 37) Plaintiff alleges lost 
business damages, "[ c ]ompensation for a lost business opportunity is a measure of damages and 
not restitution to the alleged victims" under Section 17200. Korea Supply, 29 Cal. 4th at 1151. 
Nor is Plaintiff entitled to injunctive relief. Plaintiff and Home Depot entered into a stipulation 
whereby Home Depot has been dismissed from this case with prejudice, and Home Depot has 
apparently ceased using the allegedly infringing ads at issue in this case. See Docket Nos. 38-39; 
see also Vick Decl. Ex. 9 at 36, 83-84. 
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to establish each element required to prove that Google 
intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs prospective economic advantage. 15 While Plaintiff argues 
that Google's Analytics system demonstrates Google's awareness of the fact that people visit 
Plaintiffs website (SGI ~ 39), this evidence does not establish that Google knew of specific 
parties with whom Plaintiff had a probability of future economic benefit. See Brown v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139 (S.D. Cal. 1998) ("Plaintiffmust establish an actual 
economic relationship or a protected expectancy with a third person, not merely a hope of future 
transactions.") 16 
In sum, to the extent they are not defeated by the absence of a protectable mark, 
Plaintiffs state law claims are also barred by Section 230's broad grant of immunity and the 
additional substantive defects discussed in this section. 
C. Plaintiff's Evidentiary Objections and Request Under Rule 56(d) 
Plaintiff objects to the declaration and expert report of Dr. Jerry Wind on the grounds that 
these submissions are untimely and consist of hearsay. See Docket No. 76 at 2-3. The Court 
would OVERRULE these objections. Defendant's expert report was provided to Plaintiff on 
March 27, 2013 as required by the expert disclosure guidelines in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(I). 
See Docket No. 97 at 2-3. Defendant also provided a complete copy of this report at the time the 
motion for summary judgment was filed, later filing a declaration that simply affirms the 
accuracy of the same report. !d. Courts have held that a later-filed declaration merely attesting 
to the accuracy of the same report is not suitable grounds for excluding evidence. See, e.g., 
Volterra Semiconductor Corp v. Primarion, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
Plaintiffs suggestion that it was prejudiced by the timing of the Wind Declaration and report is 
further belied by its retention of a rebuttal expert witness who prepared a report to counter 
Defendant's expert (Docket No. 72). 
15The elements of a prospective interference with economic advantage claim are "(1) an economic 
relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the 
plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed 
to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff 
proximately caused by the acts of the defendant." Korea Supply, 29 Cal. 4th at 1153. 
16Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's arguments that the state law claims were defective for these 
additional reasons. 
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The Court would also reject Plaintiffs hearsay objections. "Expert witnesses may rely on 
inadmissible hearsay in forming their opinions, so long as it is of a type reasonably relied upon 
by experts in their field." See United States v. Zarate-Morales, 377 F. App'x 696, 698 (9th Cir. 
2010) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 703). Consumer survey results such as those relied on by Professor 
Wind may serve as the basis for expert opinions. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Gibraltar Fin. Corp. OfCalifornia, 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982) (trademark "[s]urveys 
are admissible, if relevant, either as nonhearsy or through a hearsay exception," and if 
"conducted according to acepted principles are routinely admitted."). 
Plaintiff also objects to Defendant's exhibits 22 through 28 on the grounds that they were 
not produced in discovery. Id at 2-3. However, these documents were easily accessible over the 
internet and were equally available to Plaintiff. See Allen v. Woodford, No. CV-F-05-1104, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11002, at* 13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2007) ("A party is [] not in control of records 
that the requesting party has equal ability to obtain from public sources."). Moreover, any 
production of these documents prior to Defendant's filing of its motion on April 11, 2012 would 
have implicated the attorney work product doctrine. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Google's motion for summary judgment is premature 
because "Google's Counsel just recently informed Plaintiffs counsel" that Linda Spencer, a Rule 
26 witness who allegedly has knowledge of the Ad Words account at issue, will not be available 
due to maternity leave until after Memorial Day weekend- just weeks before the June 25, 2013 
trial date. See Pl. Opp. at 25-26; see also Jafari Decl., ~~ 5-8, Ex. X. As such, Plaintiff appears 
to suggest that the Court exercise its discretion to defer ruling on the motion under Rule 56( d). 
Pl. Opp. at 25. 
A plaintiff seeking a continuance under Rule 56( d) must show that "(1) it has set forth in 
affidavit form the specific facts [it] hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought 
exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose" the pending motion. Family Home & 
Finance Center, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 927 (9th Cir. 2008). 
The Court would hold that Plaintiff has failed to meet these requirements; the Opposition merely 
states that Plaintiff will suffer nonspecific "prejudice" if it is not permitted to present "additional, 
relevant evidence" through Ms. Spencer's deposition. Pl. Opp. at 25-26. This Court also denied 
Plaintiffs ex parte request to continue the trial dates based on her deposition. See Docket Nos. 
61, 82. Nor do the cited portions of the Jafari Declaration offer any specific facts that Plaintiff 
hopes to secure through Ms. Spencer, the basis for believing that those facts exist, or any reasons 
why such facts would be essential to oppose Defendant's motion. See Jafari Decl. ~~5-8. In 
light of Plaintiffs failure to justify the request for a continuance under Rule 56( d), the Court 
would DENY Plaintiffs request. See Family Home, 525 F.3d at 827 (denying request for a 
continuance because plaintiffs "generically relevant" evidence was not "essential" to opposing 
the motion for summary judgment). However, at the hearing, if Plaintiff can meaningfully 
articulate precise, compelling reasons that Ms. Spencer's deposition is "crucial" to oppose the 
instant motion, the Court may consider reevaluating the request for a continuance. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the above reasons, the Court would GRANT Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment in its entirety. 
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